Most skills acquired through on-the-job training may be specific to an occupation and therefore transferable to some but not all firms. However, economists have typically focused on skills that are either specific to a given firm or skills that are completely general. This paper explores the relationship between the size of the local market for an occupation-specific skill and job-training outcomes. The Stevens (1994) model of training predicts that as market size increases, job turnover among trained workers increases and training becomes more general. I test these predictions using data on bluecollar workers and variation in market size across U.S. metropolitan areas. The empirical results support the theoretical predictions. For both turnover and training type, the effects of market size are most relevant at low levels of market size.
Introduction
Previous research on the economics of job training has been guided by Becker's (1964) distinction between skills that are specific to a given firm and skills that are completely general. While this distinction has been valuable at a conceptual level, it fails to describe the full range of training empirically. Most skills learned on the job may be somewhere between the extremes of firm-specific and general; that is, the skills are transferable to some but not all firms. In particular, some skills are specific to the type of work one does. I show that when workers are imperfectly mobile across geographic areas, the nature of such occupation-specific skills depends on the local economic environment. This paper explores the relationship between the size of the local market for an occupation-specific skill and job-training outcomes. Becker's (1964) model of job training predicts sharp differences in training outcomes between general and firm-specific skills. For example, the model predicts that workers bear the entire costs of general skills training but share with their employer the costs of firm-specific skills. These differences suggest that the size of the local labor market might have fundamental effects on training decisions for occupation-specific skills. Recent theoretical work by Stevens (1994) provides a framework for investigating these effects. She generalizes the Becker model to encompass the case of "transferable" training, which "is of some value to at least one firm in addition to the training firm" (p. 540). Consideration of transferable training, Stevens shows, leads naturally to issues of imperfect competition in the labor market.
Two other areas of research provide motivation for this paper. Recent empirical studies on wage determination provide evidence that occupation-and industry-specific skills play a significant role in earnings. It is well-known that wages rise during a worker's tenure with an employer (e.g., Topel 1991) . However, recent evidence indicates that much of the apparent return to employer tenure is in fact due to the accumulation of industry-and/or occupation-specific experience. Evidence from Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) on wage growth with industry experience suggests the importance of industryspecific human capital. On the other hand, Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) document substantial wage returns to occupational experience and emphasize occupation-specific human capital.
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A second area of research maintains Becker's distinction between firm-specific and general skills, but challenges the assumption of perfect competition. In Becker's model, firms do not pay for general skills training because workers receive the benefits of training in the form of higher wages from other firms. However, in practice firms seem to pay for some general skills training. As a result, several authors have constructed theoretical models to explain firm-sponsored general training (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999; Autor 2001) . As Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, p. 80) explain, "in order to explain firms' investments in general skills, some labor market imperfection must exist so that the mobility of workers is restricted and that employers earn rents on trained workers." In this paper, the relevant imperfection is limited geographic mobility of workers. This force, together with the specialization that comes with training in occupation-specific skills, provides firms some market power and thus an incentive to 1 Neal (1995) looks at displaced workers and finds that the wage cost of switching industries is strongly correlated with pre-displacement measures of both work experience and tenure. Parent (2000) adds a measure of experience in the current industry to a wage-tenure regression and finds that the return to tenure with the current employer is reduced markedly. Kambourov and Manovskii (2002) find that when occupational experience is also taken into account, it is occupational experience rather than industry experience that is of primary importance in explaining wages. invest in transferable skills. More generally, this is one example of recent interest within labor economics in issues of imperfect competition and market power (Bhaskar, Manning, and To 2002) .
The next section outlines Stevens' (1994) model of on-the-job training. The model predicts that as market size increases, job turnover among trained workers increases and training becomes more general. Section 3 describes my empirical strategy for testing these predictions using data on blue-collar workers and variation in market size across U.S. metropolitan areas. Section 4 relates market size to job turnover using data from the Current Population Survey. Section 5 relates market size to the generality of training using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey of firms.
The empirical results support the theoretical predictions: in thicker markets, job turnover is greater and training is more general. In each case, the effects of market size are most important at low levels of market size. This suggests that the Stevens model is most relevant to cases where occupation-specific skills are transferable to a relatively small number of firms.
Theory

Description
In this section, I summarize the Stevens (1994) model of job training. For the present purpose, consider the labor market as a metropolitan area in which the workers are limited to working in that area. In this metropolitan economy, there are many workers and firms, but we assume constant returns to labor within a firm. This allows us to focus on the training decisions at a single firm, called firm 0. Initially, all workers are untrained and have constant productivity, initialized to zero, in all firms. A random group of these workers is attached to firm 0.
The timing of the model is as follows. There are two periods: a training period and a work period. In the first period, each worker and firm 0 decide whether or not to train and, if so, choose the level of training. The level of training is chosen to maximize the joint return of the worker and firm, net of training costs. At the start of the second period, the worker enters the labor market and then works for the training firm or some other firm.
The firm offers a type of training that is potentially useful in n other firms in the metropolitan area. The post-training productivity of the worker is given by the vector
where n i ,..., 1 = indexes the other firms that employ the skill in the area. The size of the external market, n, is taken to be exogenous. To generate the possibility of labor turnover, the model makes the productivity components i v uncertain during training.
This reflects uncertainty about either the worker's productivity within a firm or the future demand for a firm's output. Productivity is realized at the start of the second period.
The training consists of two elements: a transferable element and a specific element. The transferable element 0 ≥ m is equally useful in the training firm and the n other firms, while the specific element 0 ≥ a is useful only in the training firm. As a result, the expected value of the training is equal in all external firms, but may be greater in the training firm: It is worthwhile to note a few key assumptions of the model. First, the transferable and specific elements are perfect substitutes in production for the training firm. This would be appropriate, for example, for a firm choosing a production method from two alternatives: one specific to the firm and one common to many firms. Second, the shocks are independent across firms and independent of the level of training. As we will see, this latter feature allows the model a degree of separation between market size and the decision to invest in transferable skills.
After becoming trained, the worker enters the labor market and can work for the training firm or any of the n external firms. At this stage, the worker's true productivity in each firm is revealed and becomes public knowledge. Each of the 1 + n firms makes simultaneous wage offers to the worker and the worker chooses to work for the firm offering the highest wage. Since the worker's true productivity varies across firms, firms have some market power over trained workers. As the outcome of the bidding, the worker works at the firm at which he has the highest productivity, at a wage equal to the next-highest productivity among the other firms.
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A key aspect of the training in this model is specialization. Untrained workers are essentially undifferentiated and can perform some tasks in all firms in the metropolitan area. For example, they can clean floors, deliver mail, and help around a construction site. Trained workers, on the other hand, have specialized skills and this limits the scope of their labor market relative to the untrained. For example, a worker trained to operate a printing press can only use that skill in a printing firm. So while the labor market for untrained workers is perfectly competitive, the market for trained workers is imperfectly competitive. 
Predictions
In this section, I discuss the predictions of the Stevens model. My discussion highlights the mechanisms behind each prediction rather than formally deriving the predictions. For a more formal treatment, see the discussion in Stevens (1994) A central feature of the model is turnover -that is, the probability that the worker moves from the training firm to one of the external firms in the second period. Since firms have market power over trained workers, each of the external firms shares in the expected returns to the training. Even though it doesn't pay for the training, an external firm benefits from it if the worker's realized productivity is highest in the firm. This 2 The model is similar in this respect to Wildasin's (2000) model of investment in risky human capital. In his model, "skilled" workers can work in only one sector while "unskilled" workers can work in any sector. Wildasin's model, however, differs by assuming that skilled workers search for job matches over multiple jurisdictions. It is for this reason that he considers the market for skilled labor to be perfectly competitive, despite the immobility of skilled labor across sectors. The models are not necessarily incompatible since they focus on different types of human capital investments. Wildasin's model focuses on investment in professional skills associated with a college degree. By contrast, the model of job training considered here is relevant for blue-collar occupations, which typically do not require a college degree. feature distinguishes the model from the Becker model of investment in general and firmspecific skills, in which the training firm and the worker share the full amount of the return.
Given this externality, there is a divergence between the privately and socially optimal levels of training ) , ( a m . The privately optimal levels are chosen jointly by the worker and firm 0 to maximize the expected private return less the cost of training. The private return is the sum of the worker's wage and the profit (productivity minus wage) of the training firm. In contrast, the social optimum is based on the total expected return, which includes both the private return and the return to external firms.
For any given level of training ) , ( a m , as market size n increases, turnover increases. With a larger market, there are more competitors for trained workers, and it is more likely that the worker will have the highest realized productivity in one of the external firms, rather than the training firm. As a result, there is a smaller incentive to invest in the specific element, since turnover renders it worthless. Therefore, the socially optimal level of a decreases with n . The private optimum also shares this pattern, but the level of a is higher for each n .
The reason for this divergence is as follows. For a given n , increasing the specific element a reduces the probability of turnover. As a result, the private return increases by more than the social return through a redistribution of the expected return from external firms to the training firm.
3 Consequently, the model predicts that turnover increases in market size, through two channels. The direct effect is essentially independent of training and operates through the productivity shocks. The indirect effect comes through a smaller specific element with a larger market.
In contrast to the specific element, the choice of the transferable element m does not depend directly on market size. Due to the separability of the shocks and m in the production function, the marginal benefit of an increase in m is independent of market size n . An increase in m increases the worker's expected productivity in each of the 1 + n firms, raising the worker's wage in proportion to the increase in m without affecting the returns to any of the firms (i.e., the marginal benefit of m is equal to 1 
, m is decreasing in n but generality would still be increasing in n if the change in a dominates the change in m .
The impact of market size on the wages of trained workers is perhaps surprising.
When market size increases, wages do not necessarily increase due to the combination of two opposing effects. First, an increase in market size creates more competition for trained workers and increases wages. Second, the specific element is smaller with a larger market, leading to lower productivity in the training firm and thus lower wages.
The same ambiguity would likely translate to the wage-tenure profile, which further depends on how training costs are divided between the worker and the training firm.
Comparison to Other Models
In preparation for testing the predictions of the Stevens model, it is useful to compare the predictions to those of other models. My primary goal in this section is to discuss alternative explanations for the predictions of the Stevens model on turnover and type of training. These explanations come from two sources: other models of training and models of labor-market search. Becker's (1964) model of training doesn't explicitly consider the role of market size, but he made some conjectures that turn out to be consistent with Stevens' predictions on turnover and the generality of training. Becker assumed a perfectly competitive labor market and considered the polar cases of general and firm-specific training. With general training, firms would not care about turnover of trained workers, since workers would bear the full costs of their training. With firm-specific training, on the other hand, firms would lose their investments if trained workers left the firm. Therefore, he suggested that firms would share with workers some of the returns to firm-specific training (and, hence, some of the costs) in order to reduce the chances of turnover. 5 Becker acknowledged that much on-the-job training is neither firm-specific nor completely general, but he argued that such training can be considered as "the sum of two components, one completely general, the other completely specific" (p. 44). 6 In the case where training is transferable to a small number of firms, Becker said that the effect on training is "difficult to assess," but conjectured that such training would be more like specific training than general training because of the monopsony power held by firms (pp. 50-51). Combining these conjectures, the model predicts that as market size increases, the role of general training becomes more important and, as a result, turnover increases.
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In addition to models of training, 8 models of search and matching within an urban context might generate predictions similar to the Stevens model for the relationship between turnover and market size. Since search costs are presumably lower in larger markets, static models of search (e.g., Wheeler 2001) predict that workers and firms are more suitably matched in larger areas. 9 In a dynamic setting, lower search costs might also lead to greater turnover in larger markets, but this would seem to depend on how agents learn over time about the quality of their matches. In particular, one would expect search considerations to be important for young workers, since they are actively learning about their abilities and interests.
Empirical Strategy
My empirical work tests two predictions of the Stevens model: as market size increases, (1) job turnover among trained workers increases and (2) the generality of training increases. My empirical strategy relies on variation in market size across metropolitan areas. This approach treats the worker's current area as the relevant labor market. To support this, I limit my analysis to blue-collar workers, who are less geographically mobile than are other workers. The working assumption is that these workers are perfectly mobile within their local labor market but immobile across markets. Mobility across areas is limited by costs involved in changing residences and searching for jobs in a different area.
Some evidence on the limited mobility of blue-collar workers is presented in Table 1 . Over both the 1-year and 5-year periods ending in 1990, blue-collar workers had lower rates of mobility across states than did workers in other occupations. Between 1985 and 1990, for example, data from the 1990 Census of Population indicate that 7 percent of blue-collar workers moved between states, compared to 13 percent among white-collar workers and 10 percent among workers in clerical, sales, or service occupations.
9 Another benefit of pooling workers and firms in cities is to reduce risk associated with industry-specific
Defining Local Labor Markets
I define local labor markets using metropolitan areas. The general concept of a metropolitan area (MA) is "that of a core area containing a large population nucleus, I classify blue-collar workers into detailed occupations using the occupational classification system developed for the 1990 census. I start with 3-digit occupations shocks (Simon 1988; Diamond and Simon 1990) .
within the broad categories of "Precision Production, Craft, and Repair Occupations" and "Operators, Fabricators, and Laborers." In line with the theory, I drop occupations that don't require much in the way of training -for example, helpers and laborers. I also drop codes for supervisors of blue-collar workers and non-specific codes such as "not elsewhere classified." I combine some closely related occupations into a single category in order to avoid small cells and to make the data comparable with the OES classification system (described below). Finally, I drop occupations for which the market definition is problematic. 10 This leaves 103 occupations; examples are aircraft engine mechanics, carpenters, tool and die makers, and printing press operators. 10 That is, workers in those occupations are likely to switch to a different occupation or move to a different area. These judgments are based on tabulations from the March CPS (see Section 4.1). Occupational mobility is judged by comparing occupation at the time of the survey to occupation in the longest job in the previous year. Geographic mobility is judged by comparing state of residence at the time of the survey to state of residence in the previous year.
Measuring Market Size
11 An establishment is defined as an economic unit that processes goods or provides services, such as a factory, store, or mine. The establishment is generally at a single physical location and is engaged primarily in one type of economic activity. The OES survey includes establishments in most industries, but excludes those in agricultural production, forestry, fishing, the postal service, and the federal government.
The OES data provide two measures of market size for each occupation and MA: employment and number of establishments. Employment is defined as the number of full-time and part-time workers employed in the occupation at the time of the survey.
The second measure is the number of establishments employing the occupation. The OES survey defines occupations using 5-digit codes from the OES classification system.
I developed a crosswalk between the OES and Census systems and use it to convert the OES data to Census occupation groups. The OES data cover every MA but, due to confidentiality and data quality criteria, they do not cover every occupation within a given MA. In particular, occupation-MA cells are not reported if there are fewer than 3 establishments for a given cell or if one establishment contains 80 percent or more of the employment in a given cell. When occupational employment in an MA is less than 30, the employment count is suppressed
For the micro-level data sets used in connection with the OES data, I exclude workers in these industries from the analysis.
but the number of establishments is still reported. In this case, I impute employment as 10 workers.
Summary statistics are presented in the top panel of The measures are closely but not perfectly correlated, with a correlation of 0.82. In the analysis that follows, I measure market size using the number of establishments in order to be consistent with the theory.
Job Turnover and Market Size
Data
I test the prediction on job turnover using data from the March Current Population I restrict the sample to blue-collar workers between the ages of 18 and 64 who had at least one employer in the previous year, live in an MA, and are not selfemployed. 12 In my sample period, the CPS recorded occupations using the classification system developed for the 1990 census. As described in Section 3.1, I use 103 occupation 12 Since the turnover measure is based on employment in the previous year, I identify the worker's occupation and other job-related variables based on the longest job held in the previous year. The only exception to this rule is union status, which is based on the worker's current job since that information is not reported for the previous year. I also exclude workers who had less than one year of potential experience as of March of the previous year.
categories for blue-collar workers. For a given year of the March CPS, these procedures yield a sample of about 7,000 workers. A sample of this size is too small to support my empirical strategy, which relies on detail within occupations and MAs. Therefore, I pool the data over 13 years of the March CPS from 1990 to 2002 and control for year effects in the analysis.
My empirical strategy exploits variation in market size across MAs. In order to protect respondent confidentiality, the public-use CPS files do not identify the particular MA for workers in the smallest MAs. This prevents me from linking their records to the OES data on market size. As a result, my CPS sample is limited to workers from 262 of the 328 MAs. Excluding the smallest MAs tends to reduce the variation in market size at the lower end of the distribution within the OES data, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 2 . In the CPS sample, the median number of establishments for an occupation-MA is 27, compared to 17 in the overall OES data. Table 3 presents sample means for the individual-level data from the CPS sample.
The share of workers who had multiple employers in the previous year is 15 percent. As one might expect in a sample of blue-collar workers, the typical worker is a male with a high-school education. The sample covers a range of ages: half of the sample is between 30 and 45 years of age, with about one quarter less than 30 and one quarter greater than 45.
Specification
I estimate the effect of market size on job turnover using the specification: To estimate equation (4) with the CPS sample, I group workers into occupation-MA cells and average the individual information within each cell, leaving a dataset of 10,004 observations. For each occupation-MA in the CPS data, the OES data give the number of establishments. Even with 13 years of CPS data, there are relatively few workers in each cell: the group sizes range from 1 to 785, with a median of 3. To account for the heteroskedasticity induced by variation in group size, I use a two-step GLS estimator (Dickens 1990 ). In the first step, I estimate the extent to which the error in a cell varies with group size. Estimates of error-components variances from the first stage are then used to construct a weight for a weighted least squares estimator.
14 In addition to the simple linear specification in equation (4), I also estimate a piecewise linear specification that allows the effect of market size to vary with the level of market size. The Stevens model suggests that the effect of market size on job turnover is greatest at low levels of market size. In the example analyzed in Appendix A, for instance, the probability of job turnover as a function of the number of establishments displays the nonlinear relationship shown in Figure 1 . As market size increases, job turnover increases rapidly at low levels of market size and increases only marginally beyond that. 
Results
In the simple linear specification, increases in market size are not associated with greater job turnover ( Table 4 ). The estimate of β is positive, as expected, but its magnitude is quite small. An increase in market size from the 10 th percentile to the 90 th percentile would, according to the estimate, increase job turnover by less than 1 percentage point. This is perhaps not surprising, since much of the variation in the data is 13 Several reasons have been given for why turnover is lower in larger firms, including: (1) larger firms are less likely to go out of business, (2) monitoring costs are greater in larger firms, and (3) larger firms are more likely to use incentive contracts.
14 The qualitative results are robust to limiting the sample to cells with 3 or more workers, or to cells with 5 or more workers.
15 For simplicity, the example in Appendix A ignores the specific element a . However, including it in the model doesn't change the main point of Figure 1 . In particular, for a given value of a , the relationship between turnover and market size follows the nonlinear pattern in Figure 1 . Changing the value of a merely shifts the entire curve up or down.
at the high end of the market-size distribution, where the model suggests the effect of market size is negligible.
In contrast, the piecewise linear specification offers some support for the prediction of the model. When market size is 10 establishments or less, increases in market size are associated with greater job turnover and the effect is statistically significant. In contrast, the estimated effects for the other two ranges are negligible.
Taking the point estimates at face value, an increase of market size by 5 establishments in the first range (≤10 establishments) increases turnover by 2.0 percentage points, in the second range (10-30) decreases turnover by 0.02 percentage points, and in the third range (30+) increases turnover by 0.01 percentage points. This empirical relationship is shown in Figure 2 . As the figure demonstrates, the important variation in market size appears to be at the lowest levels.
Turning to the other variables in the model, the effects of the control variables on turnover are generally in the expected direction. Notably, turnover is higher for younger workers and part-time workers. Turnover is lower for workers in large firms and workers in the public sector. In addition, workers in larger cities (in terms of population) have lower turnover, all else equal, although the effect is small. This is consistent with evidence that larger cities have lower unemployment rates (Gan and Zhang 2003) . (Table 5 , column 2). However, it is not statistically significant and the magnitude of the effect is rather small. For instance, the estimates imply that the effect on turnover of increasing market size by 5 establishments in the lowest range, which is 2.0 percentage points overall, is only 0.2 percentage points higher for an occupation with 2 years longer training time. 16 Therefore, this second test does not provide additional support for the Stevens model.
Generality of Training and Market Size
In this section, I test the theoretical prediction that on-the-job training is more general the larger is the size of the local market for an occupation. Ideally, a test would involve the empirical counterparts of the training components in the model: the specific 
Evidence from the NLSY
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY) is an ongoing study of labor market and other experiences of a cohort that was age 14-21 in 1979. For the first and only time in 1993, when respondents were age 28-36, the NLSY included a series of questions on the generality of skills learned at the start of the worker's current job.
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First, the survey asked workers: "When you started doing this kind of work for 16 For instance, the implied effect is 1.86 percentage points for an occupation with 1 year of training time and 2.04 percentage points for an occupation with 3 years of training time.
17 For a critical review of available data on training, see Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a) . 18 The survey also asked workers to report the generality of (formal and informal) training in the previous year. I base my analysis on the questions regarding training at the start of the job because the theory outlined in Section 2 refers to training at the start of the job. For more discussion of the 1993 training data, see Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999a, 1999b all or almost all, more than half, about half, less than half, and none or almost none.
I construct a sample of blue-collar workers in the 1993 NLSY data who live in
MAs and are not self-employed. As shown in Table 6 , 251 workers in the sample reported at least one type of training at the start of their job. The most common types are guidance from supervisors and guidance from co-workers. The last column of the table shows the share of those reporting each type of training who said that "all or almost all" of the skills are transferable. Overall, 64 percent of training is considered to be fully general. Across types of training, this measure ranges from 58 percent for self-study materials to 83 percent for classes and seminars.
In order to determine whether workers in larger markets are more likely to report their training to be general, I estimate a regression of the form:
The dependent variable equals 1 if worker i reported that "all or almost all" of the skills learned in training are transferable, and equals 0 otherwise. Equation (5) generality. While effects of this magnitude are definitely important, they are not statistically significant for this sample because the associated standard errors are large. were useful in other firms, while the rest responded that "most," "some," or "almost none" of the skills were useful in other firms. In the next question, employers assessed the local market size for the occupation: "Focusing on the skills that are useful outside your company, how many other companies in the local labor market have jobs that require these skills?" The responses were spread fairly evenly over the four ranges provided in the survey: less than 5, 5-15, 16-100, and more than 100.
Evidence from the EOPP
Following my analysis of the NLSY data, I compare the generality of training to the size of the local market for occupation-specific skills. I estimate a specification similar to equation (5), with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the employer reported that "almost all" of the skills were useful in other companies; and 0 otherwise. As in the NLSY, the results indicate that training is more likely to be general in areas with more companies having jobs using the skills (Table 8 ). Compared to markets with fewer than 5 companies using the skills, employers in markets with 5-15 companies are 21 percentage points more likely to report their training to be general; for the other two ranges, 16-100 and more-than-100, the estimated effects are 34-36 percentage points. Unlike in the NLSY data, these effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, the pattern of effects across size categories suggests that the effect of market size becomes negligible beyond a certain point, as in the analysis of turnover. Increases in market size from less-than-5 to 5-15 and from 5-15 to 16-100 both increase generality, but increases in market size beyond 100 firms do not increase generality.
While these results are consistent with the predictions of the Stevens model, they are also consistent with another explanation. Suppose, for instance, that training and equipment in a given occupation is the same in all firms in all areas. For example, suppose that all printing firms use the same type of printing press, so that printing press operators learn the same skills regardless of where they work. In this case, training would be perfectly general in all areas, at least in a technological sense. However, the size of the local market might influence the perceived generality of the training. In areas with few printing firms, knowing how to operate the common press may not appear to be a general skill in the context of the local labor market because the skills are applicable at only a few local firms. In areas with many printing firms, by contrast, the same skills would appear to be quite general. This pattern of perceptions would generate a positive relationship between generality (as reported in surveys) and local market size.
The Stevens model predicts, on the other hand, that training requirements and equipment truly vary (in a technological sense) across local markets of different sizes.
For example, in small markets the model predicts that each printing firm would use a specific (different) type of press. In large markets, by contrast, all printing firms would use the same (common) type of press. In terms of the observed relationship between market size and generality, the "perception" explanation is presumably present in any event. At issue is whether the mechanism emphasized in the Stevens model is also present.
One way to distinguish between the effects of market size on the perceived versus technological generality of training is by examining the value to a worker's current employer of the worker's previous experience in related jobs. Employers in the EOPP survey were asked how many months of the worker's previous work experience had some application to the current job. The answers to this question provide a rough indicator of occupation-specific experience. In my sample, workers have an average of 3.7 years of relevant experience, compared to an average of 9.6 years of potential labormarket experience (age minus years of education minus 6).
If training in a given occupation were the same in every firm in every area, then a given amount of relevant experience would have the same value to the current employer in every area. If, on the other hand, the generality of training truly varies across areas of different size, relevant experience is more valuable in larger markets because the training is more general. The value of relevant experience to employers in the EOPP data can be judged using the starting hourly wage of the last worker hired. I estimate a wage regression in which the log wage is a function of potential experience, relevant experience, education, and market size. In one specification I also include a set of control variables to account for such factors as industry, occupation, and union status. The overall return to relevant experience is 4.3 percent per year in the specification without controls and 2.9 percent in the specification with controls (Table 9 , columns 1 and 3).
I allow the returns to relevant experience to vary with market size by adding interaction terms between relevant experience and the indicators for the three highest market-size categories. The Stevens model predicts that these coefficients are positive, whereas the "perceptions only" view implies that these coefficients are zero. In the specification without controls, these coefficients are all positive and statistically significant ( Table 9 , column 2). Furthermore, the estimated effects are economically significant in magnitude: the implied returns to potential experience are 2.4 percent for the smallest market-size category (less than 5 companies) and 4.6-5.2 percent for the other categories. As in the case of reported generality, increases in market size do not matter beyond a certain point. However, the relevant threshold is much lower in this case: 5 companies compared to 100 companies in the case of reported generality.
Adding the control variables reduces the overall return to relevant experience, but the pattern of returns by market size is similar to the specification without controls. The implied returns are 1.5 percent for the smallest category and 3.2-3.7 percent for the other categories. Compared to the specification without controls, the coefficient on the 16-100 interaction term is of similar magnitude, while the coefficients on the 5-15 and morethan-100 interaction terms are smaller.
Taken together, these results generally support the prediction of the Stevens model that the true generality of training increases with market size. Since the returns to relevant experience are larger in larger markets, the relationship between generality and market size reflects more than simply perceptions. Furthermore, the results indicate that the effects of market size on the generality of training exist primarily at the lowest levels of market size.
The positive impact of market size on generality can be interpreted as an external economy of scale from a concentration of firms employing workers in a given occupation. Since on-the-job training is more general the greater is the market size, when workers move between employers in the same area, their relevant experience is more valuable. This increases productivity and wages. This finding is consistent with Glaeser and Mare's (2001) argument that cities speed the accumulation of human capital.
Conclusion
The Stevens (1994) model extends the Becker (1964) model of job training to allow for explicit consideration of market size. The model highlights the link between labor-market size and the incentive to invest in firm-specific capital. With smaller markets, firms face less competition for their trained workers and thus experience less turnover in their workforces. As a result, firms have a greater incentive to invest in firmspecific skills. Thus, the model predicts that as market size increases, turnover increases and training becomes more general.
The empirical evidence in this analysis generally supports the theoretical predictions. In the case of both turnover and type of training, variation in occupationspecific market size is important primarily at low levels of market size. This suggests that the Stevens model is most relevant to cases where occupation-specific skills are transferable to a relatively small number of firms. Specifically for the blue-collar occupations considered here, the relevant range is less than 10 firms. Straightforward calculations indicate that roughly 15-20 percent of blue-collar workers in the United
States fall in this range.
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21 This estimate includes workers in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. For workers in metropolitan areas, the OES data indicate that 3.27% of blue-collar workers have 10 or fewer local establishments that employ their occupation. Workers outside metropolitan areas are not covered by the OES data, but the relevant percentage for them can be approximated based on OES data for workers in the smallest metropolitan areas. In areas with total population between 50,000 and 100,000, 17% of blue-collar workers have 10 or fewer local establishments that employ their occupation. It is therefore plausible that the relevant percentage for workers in non-metropolitan areas is 45-65%. Given that metropolitan areas contain 72.6% of the blue-collar workers in the nation (based on my CPS sample), those numbers imply that 15-20% of blue-collar workers nationwide face small local markets for their skills.
Appendix A. Derivation of Theoretical Model for Special Case
This appendix analyzes a special case of the model of job training developed by Stevens (1994) . Compared to the discussion of the general case in the text, restricting attention to a special case allows me to derive closed-form solutions for the training outcomes. This special case involves two restrictions on the general case: (1) no specific element in the training and (2) a uniform distribution for the random shocks.
A.1 Setup
The post-training productivity of the worker is given by:
, Under the assumptions of this special case, I derive the expected returns following the integrals presented by Stevens (1994) for the general case. (The following formulas hold for 1 ≥ n .) The total expected return to the training is:
A.2 Expected Returns
The total expected return is divided between the worker, the training firm, and the external firms, whose expected returns, respectively, are: 
The probability that the worker moves to another firm in the second period is:
A.3 Effect of Market Size on Expected Returns
With these formulas, we can investigate how the outcomes of the training problem (for a given level of training) are affected by a change in the size of the external market, n . (This exercise treats n as a continuous variable.) The total return increases with n because the maximum value of the i ε is larger with more draws:
Notice that the expected return to each external firm is the same as the expected return to the training firm:
This follows from the lack of a specific element in the productivity vector v . Therefore,
The return to each firm, including the training firm, decreases with n : with a larger market, it is more likely that another firm has the highest value. For the same reason, it is more likely that the worker will switch firms after training:
The worker's wage in the second period increases with n because the gap between Note that, in expected terms, workers are paid less than their productivity: R R w < for any ∞ < n . This has the flavor of the specific-capital model, even though training is transferable. However, as n increases, the wage increases and the gap between pay and productivity falls. Also, as
, which is the expected productivity ) (m plus the maximum productivity shock (1).
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A.4 The Training Decision
22 Stevens (1994) shows that for any distribution of i ε , (A.8)-(A.11) hold with weak inequalities. A caveat
may not hold for some distributions. But Stevens says that a sufficient condition for it to hold is that F be log-concave, which is true for a wide class of distributions including the uniform distribution considered here.
The training firm and the worker choose the level of training that maximizes their joint private return less the cost of training. The joint expected private return is the sum of the return to the training firm and the worker's wage:
(A.12)
Assume that the cost of training ) (m C is increasing and convex in m :
. The equilibrium level of training * m satisfies the first order condition:
It follows from (A.12) that the marginal private benefit of m is 1: an increase in m raises the worker's productivity in each of the 1 + n firms and thus increases his wage in direct proportion to the increase in m . Therefore, the equilibrium level * m is independent of n and determined by the cost function:
Given this result and the fact that I am ignoring the specific component, the effect of market size on training outcomes, in equilibrium, is given by the direct effects in (A.8)-(A.11) above. The firm returns and the probability of turnover do not depend on m . The worker return and the total return depend on m , but since * m is independent of n , there is no indirect effect of n through * m . As described in the text, the general case is more interesting in this regard. Notes: The unit of observation is the occupation/metropolitan area (MA) cell. "Establishments" is the number of establishments employing the occupation in the MA. "Employment" is the total number of workers in the occupation and MA. Notes: Generality is calculated using 1993 sample weights. In the last row, 251 is the number of workers reporting at least one type of training and 0.64 is the average generality over all types reported. a Sample size = 739 (Those who initially performed 100% of duties are assumed to have not received training.) b Sample size = 255 (Those who initially performed less than 100% of their current duties adequately) c Generality: Share of those reporting who say that "all or almost all" of the skills learned in the training program would be useful in doing the same kind of work for a different employer. 
Notes:
The dependent variable is the natural log of the starting hourly wage. The mean wage is $6.20 and the mean of the log wage is $1.74. Other Controls are gender, union, firm size, part-time employment, temporary or seasonal employment, industry (7 categories), and occupation (5 categories). Standard errors, in parentheses, account for the clustering and stratification in the survey design. The omitted categories are: for relevant experience × market size, relevant experience × Less than 5 Companies; for market size, Less than 5 Companies. .18
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